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Abstract
In this note we sketch an initial tentative approach to funding costs analysis
and management for contracts with bilateral counterparty risk in a simplified
setting. We depart from the existing literature by analyzing the issue of fund-
ing costs and benefits under the assumption that the associated risks cannot
be hedged properly. We also model the treasury funding spread by means of
a stochastic Weighted Cost of Funding Spread (WCFS) which helps describ-
ing more realistic financing policies of a financial institution. We elaborate
on some limitations in replication-based Funding / Credit Valuation Adjust-
ments we worked on ourselves in the past, namely CVA, DVA, FVA and related
quantities as generally discussed in the industry. We advocate as a different
possibility, when replication is not possible, the analysis of the funding profit
and loss distribution and explain how long term funding spreads, wrong way
risk and systemic risk are generally overlooked in most of the current literature
on risk measurement of funding costs. As a matter of initial illustration, we
discuss in detail the funding management of interest rate swaps with bilateral
counterparty risk in the simplified setup of our framework through numerical
examples and via a few simplified assumptions.
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1 Introduction
What is of practical concern to trading desks nowadays, as far as the risk management
of funding costs and benefits is concerned, is essentially to build-up relevant decision
tools that allow for assessing and possibly hedging the risk their future carry costs
bear on their profitability as well as gauging the costs and benefits of alternative
contract specifications. These tools can be constructed by resorting to simulation
engines, typically of Monte-Carlo type, that are required to account for the diffusion
of the market risk drivers, the future movements of discount factors, the evolution of
the contract (or portfolio of contracts) marked-to-market value(s), the evolution of
the credit qualities of the obligors, possibly until default, the contract (or portfolio
of contracts) loss upon counterparty default, but also for the exchange of collaterals,
the stochasticity of the funding spreads, the alternative hedging strategies, right-or-
wrong way risk and systemic risk.
In this article we study a number of features that need to be considered when
building-up these tools. In particular we examine in a specified setting the full dis-
tribution of funding losses, as well as right-or-wrong way risk, systemic risk, funding
spread modelling, and the asymmetry of contract profitability implied by the funding
loss.
The organisation of the paper is as follows.
In section 2, we start by recalling basic definitions for bilateral counterparty credit
risk and explain how this paper relates to the earlier literature, including our own,
on credit and funding risk valuation. We then introduce the concepts of funding loss
distribution and Funding Risk Assessment (FRA). We finally present the Weighted
Cost of Funding Spread (WCFS).
We proceed in section 3 by illustrating our approach through the examination of
the credit valuation adjustment and the funding risk measurement for interest rate
swaps, and providing numerical examples. We conclude with Section 4 by listing the
unaddressed problems and discussing further research.
2 Funding Loss Distribution
2.1 Funding Costs and Benefits: Risk Management or Val-
uation?
The examination of credit and funding adjustments and costs and of their impli-
cations on pricing has become a sensitive subject in the realm of finance since the
realization that the assumption under which financial institutions can trade without
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default risk and fund their trading activities at the ’risk free rate’ is not realistic post
financial crisis. Already in Brigo in Masetti (2005) the Credit Valuation Adjustment
for interest rate swap portfolios and equity return swaps is introduced in detail in
derivatives valuation. Most banks nowadays price their collateralized deals by means
of dedicated discount curves (Fuji et al [10], Piterbarg [14]), and aim at evaluating
the possibly significant impact of funding costs, especially on their uncollateralized
transactions. As a consequence, heightened attention has been given to proposing
unified frameworks for computing adjustments to the risk free price due to both
funding and credit effects, resulting first in separate valuation adjustments such as
Credit Valuation Adjustments (CVA) and Funding Valuation Adjustments (FVA),
or in non-separable adjustments (FCVA) (Cre´pey [7], Pallavicini et al. [13], Burgard
and Kjaer [6], Kenyon et al. [12]). This approach utilizes classical derivatives valu-
ation and a “replication approach”, even if invariance results in [13] show that the
final valuation master equations depend only on observable market rates and not on
the risk neutral theoretical rate of the risk neutral measure, see also Elouerkhaoui
(2014).
While in many situations the above ”replication approach” can be considered
adequate and a good approximation, in this paper we play devil’s advocate and we
propose an alternative approach in case the financial institution cannot dynamically
replicate funding costs themselves. In this sense we depart from the “replication
approach” based on traditional derivatives valuation and leading to the different
XVA’s above.
2.2 Basic Definitions: Credit risk, collateral and CVA
We start by recalling basic definitions regarding bilateral counterparty risk. We
partly follow Durand and Rutkowski (2013). The obligors of the contract are refered
to as the investor and the counterparty. Let τ 1 and τ 2 stand for the random times
of default of the investor and the counterparty. More generally, quantities indexed
by 1 will refer to the investor and by 2 to the counterparty. They are defined on
an underlying probability space (Ω,G,Q), where Q is the risk-neutral probability
measure. We also denote by EQ the expectation under Q and by Gt the σ-field of
all events observed by time t. It is assumed throughout that τ 1 and τ 2 are stopping
times with respect to the filtration G = (Gt)t≥0.
Definition 2.1. The investor’s loss given default L1t represents the loss incurred by
the investor in the event of the counterparty default at time t. It is equal to the
difference between the replacement cost and the settlement value of the contract at
the moment of default, that is, L1t := P
∗
t − St.
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In practice, and even tough this approach is not fully in agreement with ISDA
recommandations (see for instance [3] and [8] for a detailed analysis of these discrep-
ancies), the equivalent contract is considered equal to the risk free contract (P ∗t = Pt).
We now introduce the following
Definition 2.2. The loss processes are defined as L1t = 1{t≥τ2} L1τ2 and L2t =
1{t≥τ1} L2τ1 .
The next definition introduces wrong and right way counterparty credit risks.
Counterparty credit risk is wrong (right, resp.) way if the exposure tends to increase
(decrease, resp.) when the counterparty credit quality worsens.
Definition 2.3. The investor’s right (wrong, resp.) way counterparty credit risk is
the positive (negative, resp.) dependence between the counterparty’s creditworthi-
ness and the positive loss process L1,+t :=
[L1t ]+ = 1{t≥τ2} [L1τ2 ]+.
Definition 2.4. In the absence of collateralization, the contract’s settlement value
St in case of the counterparty’s default at time t is given by the stochastic process
St := R
2
t (Pt)
+ − (Pt)− where R2t ∈ [0, 1] is the counterparty’s recovery rate.
Proposition 2.1. In the absence of collateralization, the investor’s loss given default
L1t is given by
L1t := Pt − St = Pt −
(
R2t (Pt)
+ − (Pt)−
)
=
(
1−R2t
)
(Pt)
+.
We proceed by adding collateralization in our setting (as seen by the investor).
Definition 2.5. The collateral process Ct represents the exchange of collaterals as
specified in a Credit Support Annex.
Lemma 2.1. On the event {τ 2 = t ≤ T, τ 1 > τ 2} of counterparty’s default, the loss
given default for the investor (in the absence of segregation and initial margin) equals
L1t = (1−R2t )
(
1{Pt≥0} (Pt − C+t )+ + 1{Pt<0} (Pt + C−t )+
)
.
where C−t (C
+
t , resp.) denotes the market value of the basket of collaterals posted at
time t by the investor (the counterparty, resp.).
We are now in the position to introduce the definition of the credit value adjust-
ment.
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Definition 2.6. The credit value adjustment equals the difference between the risk
free contract Pt and the contract with counterparty credit risk P̂t:
CVAt = Pt − P̂t.
Proposition 2.2. The price P̂t of a contract with bilateral counterparty risk is equal
to the difference of the risk-free price Pt of the contract and the price of the protection
leg of a contingent CDS written on the investor’s loss L1 due to the counterparty’s
default before the contract termination T , augmented by the price of the protection
leg of a contingent CDS written on the counterparty’s loss L2 due to the investor’s
default before the contract termination T . This means that the following equality
holds, for every t ∈ [0, T ] on the event {t < τ 1 ∧ τ 2},
CVAt = Pt + Pt(L1)− Pt(L2).
2.3 Specifying the Funding Loss Distribution
We adopt a simplifying scheme where the funding of a financial institution’s activities
is managed by the Treasury and the Finance departments by means of a combination
of short and long term borrowings. These are entered following the business inflows
and outflows forecasts, including the exchange of collaterals. Finding a good hedge
for these costs, at portfolio or stand alone product level, is a difficult task in practice
essentially because a bank is not allowed to hedge against movements in its own
credit quality by resorting to credit default swaps on its own name. Hence, typically,
only partial hedging can be achieved by using proxies such as indices or bonds. It
follows that, when valuing a financial instrument, the inclusion of funding costs based
on risk neutral valuation is debatable.
In this paper we take the view of a financial institution that cannot dynamically
replicate its funding costs and we examine the funding costs from a risk measurement
standpoint rather than from a valuation point of view. We borrow the typical risk
management terminology and introduce the ’funding loss’ distribution of a contract
or portfolio under the physical or real world probability measure P.
Our approach entails that we see funding as an indirect cost specific to each
obligor similarly to, for instance, operational costs. We do not include funding into
the ’replication price’ of a contract (as in [13], [7]) but instead consider funding risk
analysis as a decision making component to assess the contract profitability. Notice
that this approach offers an advantage in terms of computation since we do not have
to deal with the complexity that follows from the integration of funding costs into
nonlinear valuation (see [7],[13],[5],[1]). Also, our methodology fits the perspective
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of a financial institution that is planning to manage funding risk through a global
’macro-hedging strategy’, meaning that the financial institution manages globally
the funding costs of the whole portfolio of financial instruments.
We now proceed by specifying what we mean by funding costs and risks. To
this end, let us consider the processes that can potentially require cash lending or
borrowing from the trading desks.
Firstly, the investor may decide to hedge its contract obligations as well as asso-
ciated CVA, i.e dynamically construct a self financing replicating portfolio for both
the risk free contract and the CVA. Secondly, the investor may be required to imple-
ment full or partial collateralization of the contract. Thirdly, the investor might need
to fund a residual loss (or cash in a benefit) in the event of counterparty default.
By residual loss due to default we mean for instance the loss that is not covered
by the replicating CVA portfolio due to discrepancies between the equivalent con-
tract, generally supposed to be risk free in the hedging calculations, and the actual
replacement contract upon default (see [3] and [8] for a discussion on the impact of
varied settlement conventions upon default). We may also include other potential
losses such as those incurred in when selling collateral under a period of liquidity
constraints. Each of these components, which we will refer to as the hedging pro-
cess Ht, the collateralization process Ct (introduced in the previous section) and the
loss process Lt (not to be mistaken for Lt), potentially requires cash borrowing or
lending, and hence an associated funding cost, leading to a cumulative funding loss.
In the following we introduce the funding requirement process, as well as the
funding process, before defining formally the funding loss.
Definition 2.7. The funding requirement process f 1t of a portfolio for the investor
represents, at any time t, the investor’s positive or negative funding requirements
when financing or investing the cash flows given or received during the hedging
process Ht, the collateralization process Ct and the loss process Lt. We will see
later precise quantitative definitions for the process f 1t . As an initial example, for an
uncollateralized contract we may have
f 1t =
(− P̂t)− − (− P̂t)+ .
Definition 2.8. The funding process F1t of a portfolio for the investor represents,
at any time t, the investor’s funding cost or benefit when financing or investing the
funding requirement at time t. We will see later precise quantitative definitions for
the process F1t . As an initial example, for an uncollateralized contract we may have
F1t = φ+t
(− P̂t)− − φ−t (− P̂t)+ ,
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where φ+ is the interest rate we pay on borrowed amounts and φ− is the interest rate
we receive on lent amounts.
Definition 2.9. The funding loss Φ1 of a portfolio with maturity T for the investor
is the cumulated discounted funding costs or benefits until contract termination or
obligor default, that is
Φ1 =
∫ τ1∧τ2∧T
0
D(0, t)F1t dt.
where D(0, t) denotes the discount factor for time t.
Remark 2.1. Which discount? It is important to point out here that we are
discounting using a theoretical discount factor that has no clear direct interpretation,
although considering funding costs as indirect costs naturally leads to discounting at
some risk free rate, typically OIS/overnight. More generally, we might as well omit
discounting in a risk measurement approach. However, we feel that since we are
addressing funding costs, discounting should be included in the loss being measured.
Even so, despite the above argument for OIS, it is not clear at which rate we should
really discount. Adopt OIS as a proxy of the risk free rate would be a compromise,
since the real discounting rate we will apply might depend on the actual funding
policy itself, leading then to a recursive type equation. Even in the risk neutral
valuation approach the recursion was found to be there, but in that context the
theoretical risk free rate would disappear in an exact way from the equations, see
for example [13, 5, 4], due to an invariance result. Here, for the time being, we will
assume we are discounting at overnight, but this is an aspect of the analysis that
needs further discussion.
Note that the funding loss may be either positive or negative, in which latter case
it represents a gain. We are now in the position to introduce the funding distribution
of a contract.
Definition 2.10. The P-funding distribution (or the funding distribution when no
confusion arises) of a contract for the investor is the distribution of the funding loss
Φ1 under the real measure P.
In this article we argue that the funding distribution, that is usually not discussed
much in the literature, is a key tool as far as funding risk management is concerned. In
particular, the risk neutral or even P average of the funding cost cash flows typically
do not provide sufficient information on the funding risk.
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Let us recall here that the average funding costs, as typically computed when
pricing a deal with funding and credit risk under the risk neutral measure, is related
to what is commonly referred to as the ’funding valuation adjustment’.
Definition 2.11. A simplified version of the Funding Valuation Adjustment of a
contract for the investor FVA1 is the mean of the funding distribution of the contract
when computed under the risk neutral measure Q:
FVA1 = EQ
[
Φ1
]
.
In our framework it is natural to introduce a risk measurement counterparty
to the valuation one above. This measurement should be used to assess contract
profitability and risk rather than a precise contract valuation to be quoted to a
client or an internal desk. We call this quantity the Funding Risk Assessment
Definition 2.12. The Funding Risk Assessment FRA1 of a contract for the investor
is a risk statistics extracted from the funding loss. It can be a quantile based on a
given confidence level, a tail expectation beyond that quantile, etc.
For instance, if the distribution loss exhibits a very low variance and kurtosis,
then the FRA could be chosen as the mean of the loss distribution. However, in
case of a large variance or kurtosis, the financial institution may decide to resort to a
conservative quantile, say 95%, in order to almost fully cover its risk. More generally,
the characterization of the FRA would depend not only on the funding risk profiles
at single name and portfolio levels, but also on the general policy of the financial
institution regarding funding risk management, and potential regulatory constraints.
We can now formulate the following proposition, which essentially comes from the
fact that the perfect replication of hedging costs is typically not possible in our
setting.
Proposition 2.3. The Funding Risk Assessment is typically not equal to either the
funding valuation adjustment
FRA1 6= FVA1
or the risk neutral expectation of the funding distribution
FRA1 6= EQ
[
Φ1
]
.
We finally introduce the concept of Funding Risk Credit Valuation Adjustment,
which also departs from the the Funding Credit Valuation Adjustment FCVA as
typically found in the literature.
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Definition 2.13. The Funding Risk Credit Valuation Adjustment FRCVA1 of a con-
tract for the investor is the adjustment to the profitability of the risk-free contract
due to bilateral counterparty credit risk and the investor’s funding risk. Neglecting
double counting issues as a first approximation, we may set
FRCVA1 = FRA1 + CVA1.
Remark 2.2. Additive adjustment. Even in the valuation context, it is clear that
funding costs are not really an additive adjustment, see [13, 1]. The industry applies
an additive adjustment as a computationally feasible approximation. In our setup
FRA is a risk measure, so it should not be simply added to the other adjustments
coming from the risk neutral approach, such as CVA. Nonetheless, for the purpose of
providing a single number expressing the deal profitability, we defined the FRCVA
quantity above. This quantity has to be taken as indicative and not as a precise
valuation quote. What retains real interest in our analysis, however, is the funding
loss distribution and the related funding loss statistics.
We will illustrate our definitions in the next section when examining the fund-
ing loss distribution of interest rate swaps. We now provide further details on the
computation of the funding loss.
When computing the funding loss distribution, special attention must be paid to
modelling the funding spread. The model must rightly reflect the way the financial
institution finances its activities, as well as the relationship between the Treasury de-
partment and the trading desk. Also, the interplays between the funding requirement
and the funding process must be fully understood.
Let us start our discussion by distinguishing the cost of funding from the benefit
of investing for the trading desk, as quoted by the treasury.
Definition 2.14. The funding spread φ1,+t for the investor is the instantaneous cost
of borrowing one unit of cash at time t from the treasury department for the trading
desk of the investor.
Definition 2.15. The investing spread φ1,−t for the investor is the instantaneous
benefit of lending one unit of cash at time t to the treasury department for the
trading desk of the investor.
We point out that if a trading desk is always net borrowing, giving back cash to
the treasury will simply reduce lending, and the benefit will presumably be the same
rate the treasury charges for borrowing. This symmetry however could be broken by
treasury policies taking into account maturity transformation, netting sets, incentives
and other policies.
We further introduce the Credit Support Annex (CSA) collateral funding rate.
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Definition 2.16. The Credit Support Annex collateral funding rate ψt stands for the
rate that is earned by an obligor on its posted collateral as specified in the Credit
Support Annex agreed upon with its counterparty.
For instance, the CSA funding rate on cash collateral is usually the overnight
interest rate, namely the effective Federal Funds rate for US dollars, TOIS for Swiss
francs, EONIA for Euro and SONIA for British pounds.
In the next definition we introduce the general concept of right-and-wrong way
funding risk, which reflects the dependence between the funding requirement and
funding spreads.
Definition 2.17. The investor’s right (wrong, resp.) way funding risk is the nega-
tive (positive, resp.) dependence between the investor’s funding spreads φ1t and the
funding requirement process f 1t .
In other words, there is wrong (right resp.) way risk for the investor when his
funding requirements tend to increase (decrease resp.) when its funding spread φ1,+
deteriorates ( improves resp.), resulting in increasing (decreasing resp.) funding costs.
But there is also wrong (right resp.) way risk for the investor when his funding
requirements, when negative, tend to decrease (increase resp.) when its investing
spread φ1,− deteriorates ( improves resp.), resulting in decreasing (increasing resp.)
funding gains.
In the same line of thought we introduce the right-or-wrong way systemic funding
risk.
Definition 2.18. The investor’s right (wrong, resp.) way systemic funding risk is the
positive (negative, resp.) dependence between systemic illiquidity and the funding
requirement process f 1t .
Put it differently, there is wrong-way systemic funding risk for the investor if its
funding requirements increase when funding resources are becoming scarce within the
financial system due to heightened systemic illiquidity risk, resulting in an overall
increase in funding costs. We do not illustrate specifically this concept in the article
but will address it in further research. We will also need to provide a precise definition
of systemic illiquidity risk.
To conclude this section we list some examples of formalization of funding loss
under the hypothesis of collateralization or in the absence of collateralization, with
hedging assets traded in swapped form and assuming that the impact on the funding
loss distribution of the early termination due to early default is negligible. We
will assume these two conditions to hold throughout the paper. The simplifications
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these two assumptions provide allow us to stress the main conclusions drawn by our
analysis without going into too much detail.
We should mention that these two assumptions, which can be found in part of
the literature, are debatable, and we will examine them further in future research.
For the time being, we believe it is important to explain how hedging strategies
funding costs are considered. When resorting to a Monte-Carlo simulation, it is
possible to try to replicate the actual hedging strategy that would be conducted by
the trading desk. Since the sensitivities of the contracts, as well as the ones of the
hedging instruments, can be computed at each Monte-Carlo step, one can estimate
the number of contracts that the trading desk would need to purchase in view of
hedging. One can then deduce the actual cash necessary to purchase the hedging
instruments. Consecutively one can try to assess the funding costs not in light of
its theoretical replication price but given this specific cash and hedging policy of the
desk. If the desk envisages several scenarios of practical replication, then the desk
can decide to assess the funding loss distribution for each of these specific scenarios
in order to get additional insight about the most appropriate strategy. This in turn
shows that there is neither a unique funding loss distribution for the investor, nor a
unique profitability profile for a given financial instrument.
Proposition 2.4. The funding loss of an uncollateralized contract, assuming that
the hedging assets are traded in swapped form at no upfront payment, is given for the
investor by
Φ1 =
∫ τ1∧τ2∧T¯
0
D(0, t)
(
φ1,+t
(− P̂t)− − φ1,−t (− P̂t)+) dt
The intuition behind this proposition is as follows. It is assumed that the fund-
ing costs come solely from the hedging process Ht. At any time t, the investor is
replicating the counterparty contract market value including the potential loss upon
default hence the investor holds −P̂t. If −P̂t is positive (resp. negative), the investor
can invest (must borrow) the proceeds through the treasury department, having an
instantaneous benefit (resp. cost) of φ1,−t
( − P̂t)+ (resp. φ1,+t ( − P̂t)−). Finally
notice that, first, the investor does not need to borrow any additional cash, nor does
he receive any proceedings associated with the purchase of the hedging instruments,
since they are in swapped form, and second, the hedging is perfect in the sense that
there is no additional cost or benefit, on the event of counterparty default. This
assumes somewhat unrealistically that default risk is perfectly hedged. This implies
that the replacement loss is null, as was hypothesized, which means in particular
that there is no contagion effect at the first default / closeout.
We now consider the situation of a collateralized contract.
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Proposition 2.5. The funding loss of a collateralized contract, assuming that the
hedging assets are traded in swapped form at no upfront payment, is given for the
investor by
Φ1 =
∫ τ1∧τ2∧T¯
0
D(0, t)
(
ψt
(− P̂t)− − ψt (− P̂t)+) dt = ∫ τ1∧τ2∧T¯
0
D(0, t)ψt P̂
1
t dt
The idea here is that the funding costs come both from the hedging process Ht
and the collateralization process Ct . At any time t, the investor is replicating the
counterparty contract market value including the potential loss upon default hence
is holding −P̂t. If −P̂t is positive, the investor can use the proceeds as a collateral
and hence receive the associated collateral funding rate. On the other hand, if −P̂t
is negative, the investor receives collateral whose amount is equal to the replication
loss and hence does not need to borrow from treasury. However the investor needs
to finance the received collateral at the collateral funding rate.
It is important to stress that collaterals due to a trading desk are, in practice, not
actually received by the desk but can be kept in the treasury or back office. Also, the
pricing of a stand alone contract in the presence of collateralization typically neglects
that collateralization occurs at the level of the whole portfolio of contracts with the
counterparty, which implies that the knowledge of the contract marked-to-market
value may not be enough so as to estimate the future exchange of collaterals. These
two comments imply that the actual collateral process within the financial institution
must be properly scrutinized.
As a matter of illustration, we consider the funding costs of a contract where
collateral is not passed to the desk.
Proposition 2.6. The funding loss of a collateralized contract, assuming that the
hedging assets are traded in swapped form at no upfront payment and under the
situation where collateral is not passed to the trading desk, is given for the investor
by
Φ1 =
∫ τ1∧τ2∧T¯
0
D(0, t)
(
φ1,+t
(− P̂t)− − ψt (− P̂t)+) dt
In this case the funding costs come from both the hedging process Ht and the
collateralization process Ct. At any time t, the investor is replicating the counter-
party contract market value including the potential loss upon default, and hence is
holding −P̂t. If −P̂t is positive, the investor can use the proceeds as collateral, hence
receiveing the associated collateral funding rate. Conversely, if −P̂t is negative, the
investor needs to borrow the full amount from the treasury.
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Finally, let us mention that it is sometimes argued that funding costs must be
included into pricing since otherwise the obligors would not agree on striking a deal
as the addition of the (expected) funding loss to the price (without funding costs),
as seen from each obligor, could not match. It is true that funding loss introduces
asymmetry. However, even in the replication analysis deal specific valuation measures
and asymmetries may appear, see for example [5].
Moreover, we conjecture that if symmetry had to be present rigorously, then no
deal would ever be striken in the market. Firstly, as it is shown for instance in [8],
counterparty credit risk can introduce price asymetry anyway. Secondly, notice that
it has been a common practice for banks to account for the funding loss as an indirect
cost or benefit that impacts the profit & loss of trading desks hence funding costs
were to some extent already passed to the client.
2.4 Weighted Cost of Funding Spread
Funding and investing spreads are generally modelled by means of instantaneous
spreads that are tied to the financial institution credit risk spread ([6], [7], [14], [13]).
This practice does not always reflect the typical combination of short term and long
term commitments an organisation may adopt in order to finance its operations in
the framework of a global ’Corporate Financing Strategy’ set-up by the Finance
or Treasury departments of the organisation itself. Also, possible ’macro-hedging’ of
funding costs by the financial institution is not always considered. In fact, the precise
modelling of the funding spread requires to dig into the intricacies of the organisation
financing policy, and in particular the mandate of the treasury desk (see for instance
Brigo et al. in [4]). For instance, one would need to know whether the treasury desk
operates as a ’profit center’ that aims at maximising its profitability, if it applies
different funding conditions depending on the riskiness of a contract and/or the
credit riskiness of the counterparty etc. The paper [13] gives a couple of examples
with different granularity for the funding strategy, but in general this problem is
hardly addressed.
The restricted level of generalisation we must keep here entitles us to propose
a simplified Weighted Cost of Funding Spread (WCFS) whose benefit is to be more
general than the prevailing approaches in the literature whilst giving general intu-
itions about funding costs management. Before presenting the model, we need to
state a few definitions.
Definition 2.19. The funding factor Θ1t of the investor is the ratio at time t of the
amount of short-term funding of the investor with regard its total amount of funding.
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It is important to mention here that the approach ought to be natural to finan-
cial analysts as Θ can be considered as reflecting the proportion of working capital
requirement per total amount of borrowing of the bank. We now introduce the
associated short-term and long-term funding spreads.
Definition 2.20. The short-term funding spread φs,1,+t for the investor is the instan-
taneous cost for the investor of borrowing cash short-term in the market at time t.
In other words, the short-term treasury funding spread is equal to the average
cost of funding restricted to the short-term period.
Definition 2.21. The long-term funding spread φl,1,+t for the investor is the instan-
taneous cost for the investor of borrowing long-term cash in the market at time t.
The short-term and long term funding spreads typically correspond to some av-
erage of the repo and other short-term borrowings on one hand, and bonds and
other long-terms borrowings on the other hand. We are now ready to introduce the
Weighted Cost of Funding Spread.
Definition 2.22. The Weighted Cost of Funding Spread φΘ,1,+t for the investor is the
funding spread obtained by combining the short-term and long term funding spreads
in proportion to the funding factor:
φΘ,1,+t = Θ
1
t φ
s,1,+
t +
(
1−Θ1t
)
φl,1,+t .
It is important to note that, as a matter of simplification, we do not distinguish
between the funding spreads of the trading desk and treasury (hence only refer to the
”investor”). In other words, we assume that treasury passes to the trading desk the
exact weighted funding cost corresponding to the investor’s overall funding strategy.
We proceed by introducing similar definitions for the funds invested by the finan-
cial institution.
Definition 2.23. The short-term investment spread φs,1,−t for the investor is the
instantaneous benefit for the investor of lending cash short-term in the market at
time t.
Definition 2.24. The long-term investment spread φl,1,−t for the investor is the in-
stantaneous benefit for the investor of lending cash long-term in the market at time t
.
Definition 2.25. The investment factor Γ1t of the investor is the ratio at time t of
the amount of short-term investment of the investor with regard the total amount of
investment.
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Definition 2.26. The Weighted Cost of Investment Spread φΓ,1,−t for the investor is
the investment spread obtained by combining the short-term and long term invest-
ment spreads in proportion to the investment factor:
φΓ,1,−t = Γ
1
t φ
s,1,−
t +
(
1− Γ1t
)
φl,1,−t .
It should be clear that the weighted spreads methodology facilitates the analysis
of funding management by giving boundary values for funding. For instance, it
suffices to compute the funding costs of a strictly positive funding exposure with
the spread corresponding to the short-term funding spread (respectively the long-
term funding spread) to obtain a low bound (respectively high bound) forasmuch as
long term funding is generally more costly than short term funding. We conjecture
that the ’real’ funding cost, or benefit, somehow lies ’in between’, i.e at a value
that we can approximate by using the proper WCFS/WCIS and funding/investment
factors Θ/Γ. Note in particular that the assessment of funding costs by resorting to
the prevailing interest rate complemented by the CDS/bond basis for the financial
institution would typically underestimate the funding loss.
3 Interest Rate Swap Funding Loss and FRCVA
Typically, funding costs are computed within the industry by resorting to a spot fund-
ing curve provided by treasury which allows to bootstrap forward funding spreads,
the latter being used as proxies for the actual future funding spreads. In this section
we rather compute and discuss the funding loss distribution as well as the FRCVA of
uncollateralized interest rate swaps by resorting to stochastic weighted funding and
investment spreads.
The interest rate swaps under scrutiny start in 1 year and are payer interest
rate swaps with maturities 10 and 30 years, respectively. The fixed legs compound
annually with a rate of 3 % and the floating legs compound semi-annually. The
notional is 1 million euros. The investor and the counterparty, which we will also refer
to as the ”bank” and the ”counterparty”, are A and BBB rated (with ”equivalent”
flat spreads of 115 bp and 200 bp, respectively). Let us start by describing our
modelling assumptions before discussing numerical results. We should point out
that the following examples have illustrative purpose and are not fully accurate in
terms of market conventions and definitions.
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3.1 Forward Interest Rate Swap
The holder at time t of a payer forward interest rate swap settled in arrears with
tenor 0 ≤ T0, T1, . . . , Tm = T commits to swap at fixed dates Ti, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m the
floating Libor rate L(Ti−1), resetting at Ti−1 for maturity Ti, against a fixed spread,
denoted by κ, on a notional amount N .
The future, default-free, discounted cash flows at any time t ∈ [0, T1] are given
by (neglecting accrual terms for simplicity)
Π(t, T ) = N
m∑
i=2
D(t, Ti)
(
L(Ti−1)− κ
)
(Ti − Ti−1) .
By the ith forward swap we mean the swap with the first reset date Ti−1 and the
cash flows at settlement dates Ti, . . . , Tm. The price at time 0 of the ith forward
swap equals
Si,m0 = N EQ
[ m∑
l=i+1
D(0, Tl)
(
L(Tl−1)− κ
)
αl
]
= N B(0, Ti)−
m∑
l=i+1
clB(0, Tl),
where we denote cl = N καl for l = i + 1, 2, . . . ,m− 1 and cm = N (1 + κ)αm with
αl = Tl−Tl−1. B(0, T ) denotes the zero coupon bond for maturity T associated with
the LIBOR curve. We point out that here we are assuming a single curve setup but
we should generalize this to multiple curves. Similarly the price at any time t ≤ Ti−1
of the forward swap is given by
Si,mt = N EQ
[ m∑
l=i+1
D(t, Tl)
(
L(Tl−1)− κ
)
αl
]
= N B(t, Ti)−N
m∑
l=i+1
clB(t, Tl).
3.2 Exposure Modelling Assumptions
The computation of the funding loss of an interest rate swap with stochastic funding
spreads can be obtained through the joint Monte-Carlo simulation of the interest rate
curve and the obligors’ credit spreads. This approach not only provides scenarios of
the future marked-to-market values of the swap but gives also the associated funding
spreads at any Monte-Carlo step, which allows for the swift computation of the
funding loss distribution.
Although the computation is made under the historical measure P, we use the
same framework for computing approximated values of the credit valuation adjust-
ment (that is usually done under Q) for the interest rate swap in view of estimating
the FRCVA.
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We should mention that we approximate the future marked-to-market values by
the risk free values, that is we do not take the future credit valuation adjustment or a
possible expectation of funding losses due to the replacement close-out into account.
The approximation avoids having to resort to more time consuming simulations such
as Monte-Carlo of Monte-Carlos, sub-paths and the likes.
Following on the lines of Jamshidian and Zhu [11], we model the interest rate term
structure dynamics by calibrating n zero coupon continuously compounded rates as
lognormal exponential Orstein Uhlenbeck processes. This approach for the short rate
would be similar to a Black-Karazinski model, but here we use it for the spot rate.
Given the spot rates at a point in time we interpolate the whole zero coupon rates
across maturities. More specifically, let us denote by Zi = R(t, Ti) the zero-coupon
continuously-compounded spot interest rate at time t for maturity Ti. We set
Zi(t) = zi(t) exp
(
Xi(t)− 1
2
ν2i (t)
)
, i ∈ [1, . . . , n] (1)
where zi denotes the forward value of the zero coupon rate and Xi is its associated
Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process, with variance ν2i given below:
dXi(t) = −λiXi(t) dt+ σi dWi(t), i ∈ [1, . . . , n] ,
where λi and σi stand for the mean reversion speed and the volatility of the risk
driver Xi, whilst Wi denotes its associated Brownian motion.
We need to specify under which measure W is a Brownian motion, which amounts
to specify the expectation hypothesis we wish to adopt. If we work under the physical
measure P as initially stated, then W is a Brownian motion under P. In such a case,
we would have
EP[Zi(t)] = zi(t)
so that zi would not be real forward rates but P expectations of future spot rates.
Using forward measures would bring us back to real forward rates. In general there
will be a market price of risk affecting zi when compared with actual forward rates.
In this first analysis we neglect the market price of risk estimation and we do not
discuss expectation hypotheses in detail, similarly to [11].
We recall that the Ornstein-Ulhenbeck process is normally distributed, so that
we have
Xi(t) ≡ N (0, ν2i (t)) , Xi(0) = 0
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with
ν2i (t) = σ
2
i
1− exp(−2λit)
2λi
.
As is well known, it follows that the volatility is strictly increasing and bounded
by the long term volatility σ2i,∞ such that
σ2i,∞ =
σ2i
2λi
.
Also, the risk driver Xi(t), whose initial value is null, is given by
Xi(t) = exp(−λi t)
∫ t
0
exp(λi u)σi dWi(u) , Xi(0) = 0
so that the zero coupon rate is given at any time t by substituting this last formula
in (1).
The correlation among the zero coupon rates’ risk drivers is given by the following
matrix (ρ) of quadratic covariations:
ρi,j dt = d〈Wi ,Wj〉t, (i, j) ∈ [1, . . . , n]2 .
In addition, we assume that the credit spreads κi of the obligors across maturities
are modelled by shifting the initial credit spread curve as a function of the evolution
of the 5 years spread. More specifically the x years CDS spread is given by :
κi,xYt = κ
i,xY
0
κi,5Yt
κi,5Y0
.
where i = 1 for the investor (resp. 2 for the counterparty).
In turn we assume the dynamics of the 5 years credit spread to be linked to the
evolution of some credit indices by beta projection. More specifically, the 5 years
spread is lognormally distributed :
κi,5Yt = κ
i,5Y
0 exp
(
σiWi(t)− 1
2
(σi)
2t
)
,
and its risk driver Wi is given as a function of the risk drivers W
I
k of the credit indices
and an idiosyncratic component i:
Wi(t) =
∑
k
βkW
I
k (t)−
√
1−
∑
k
β2k i,
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where the βk are obtained by historical regression against the evolution of the spreads
credit indices. The latter are modelled as log-normal process.
Now, in order to account for the fact that the obligors can fund their activities
in different currencies, we assume that the investor and the counterparty fund their
operations in EUR and USD, respectively. The interest rate model we previously
described is used for simulating both the EUR and the USD interest rate term
structures. The exchange rate η between EUR and USD is modeled as a log-normal
processes :
ηEUR,USDt = η
EUR,USD
0 exp
(
σW η(t)− 1
2
(σ)2t
)
.
Clearly, one benefit of this approach is the ease with which one can construct the
correlation structure between the diffusion risk drivers and hence the risk factors.
Formally, one can extend the correlation matrix to:
ρi,j dt = d〈Wi , dWj〉t, (i, j) ∈ [1, . . . , n+ k + 1]2 .
where we conveniently re-indexed the shocks W I and W η, and where n and k denote
the number of simulated zero coupon rates and the number of drivers used in the
diffusion of each of the obligors’ 5 year spreads, in addition to the FX risk driver.
We should point out that in this first sketchy analysis we are including different
currencies without analyzing rigorously the change of measure effects on default
intensities and the FX effects on collateral, for which we refer to [10].
3.3 Funding Modelling Assumptions
At each Monte Carlo step, the price of each interest rate swap can be obtained
analytically by means of the zero rates interest rate curve, that give us immediately
all the relevant discount bonds needed to value the swap.
In turn, the funding loss for the investor can be computed, again assuming that
the hedging assets are traded in swapped form at no upfront payment, by applying
the equation
Φ1 =
∫ τ1∧τ2∧T¯
0
D(0, t)
(
φΘ,1,+t
(− P̂t)− − φΓ,1,−t (− P̂t)+) dt.
Assuming for simplicity that the counterparty is default free, the funding loss distri-
bution reads
Φ1 =
∫ τ1∧T¯
0
D(0, t)
(
φΘ,1,+t
(− P̂t)− − φΓ,1,−t (− P̂t)+) dt.
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The previous equation puts into sharp focus the dependency of the funding loss on
the investor’s own probability of default. In the situation where the investor benefits
also from a high credit quality, the formula can be approximated further for relatively
short term financial instruments by
Φ1 '
∫ T¯
0
D(0, t)
(
φΘ,1,+t
(− P̂t)− − φΓ,1,−t (− P̂t)+) dt.
Notice that in practice the termination date of the financial instrument does not
necessarily correspond to its actual maturity. Banks tend to account for the expected
termination date so as not to charge a funding adjutment that could prove to be
uncompetitive.
In order to estimate the funding spread process so as to obtain the full distribution
of the funding loss, we resort to the weighted spread methodology we introduced in
the previous chapter. As a matter of simplification, we assume that the Weighted
Cost of Funding Spread and the Weighted Cost of Investment Spread are equal and
in particular Γ = Θ. Now, we specify the WCFS,
φΘ,i,+t = Θ
i
t φ
s,i,+
t +
(
1−Θit
)
φl,i,+t ,
with
φs,i,+t = Z
3Y
t + κ
i,3Y
t , φ
l,i,+
t = Z
10Y
t + κ
i,10Y
t ,
where ZTt denotes the zero coupon rate of maturity T years and κi stands for the
obligor spread at time t, with i = 1 ( resp. i = 2 ) for the investor (respectively the
counterparty). In other words, we assume that the 3 years (10 years respectively)
spread, complemented by the 3 years CDS spread (10 years CDS spread respectively),
gives a good representation of the short term (respectively long term) borrowing cost
of the obligors. Notice that the funding rate depends on the funding currency of the
obligor. For instance, for the investor, the equality reads
φs,1,+t = Z
EUR,3Y
t + κ
1,3Y
t , φ
l,1,+
t = Z
EUR,10Y
t + κ
1,10Y
t .
3.4 Numerical Implementations and Representations
We start our discussion by representing risk metrics for the exposures of the swaps.
Figure 1 and Figure 2 display the Expected Positive Exposure, 95th percentile and
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Figure 1: Bank - 10 Years Swap Figure 2: Bank - 30 Years Swap
99th percentile exposures of the 10 years and 30 years swaps, from the Bank point
of view.
Next, Figures 3 and 4 exhibit the funding distributions of the investor for the 10
years swap, under the hypothesis that the funding costs are function of the short term
funding only (Θ = 1). The probability densities as well as the cumulated distribution
functions are given. We also show the mean and the 95%th percentile. The mean
is negative since the exposure is mostly negative for the bank. More precisely, in
this example the bank expects to reap a general funding benefit of 3700 euros. With
different exposure profiles and different funding rates, we could easily get an expected
cost instead of an expected benefit. Our numerical studies later will still concern this
example, so in Tables 1 and 2 we will see mostly a benefit situation on average, but
this is just an example. However, we should not look just at the expectation. The
funding loss distribution support is both negative and positive, resulting in a benefit
or a cost for the investor in different scenarios, and exhibits a relatively large variance.
Indeed, in approximately 20% of scenarios, total contract funding happens to be a
cost, as it can be seen thanks to the cumulated loss distribution. In particular, the
95th percentile represents a potential loss of 8,000 Euros.
Figures 5 and 6 provide similar statistics regarding the funding loss distribution of
the 30 years swap. The mean indicates a benefit of 11,000 euros, whilst the variance
of the distribution as well as the probability of an actual loss have increased compared
to the 10 years case. The bank can suffer a loss with a probability of approximately
30%, and the 95th percentile reaches 80,000 Euros, that is roughly 8 times the mean.
Figures 7-10 provide the funding statistics for the 10 years and 30 years swaps
from the counterparty point of view. As expected, the means are positive since the
exposures are generally positive. More specifically, for the 10 years swap, the mean
equals 6400 USD and the 95th percentile is 16,000 USD, whilst for the 30 years swap,
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Figure 3: Bank - 10 Years Swap
Funding - PDF: Θ = 1
Figure 4: Bank - 10 Years Swap
Funding - CDF: Θ = 1
Figure 5: Bank - 30 Years Swap
Funding PDF: Θ = 1
Figure 6: Bank - 30 Years Swap
Funding CDF: Θ = 1
FRA = 21,000 USD and 95th percentile is 110,000 USD. Again the risk in absolute
and relative terms tends to increase with swap duration.
Figure 7: Counterparty - 10 Years Swap
Funding PDF: Θ = 1
Figure 8: Counterparty - 10 Years Swap
Funding CDF: Θ = 1
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Figure 9: Counterparty - 30 Years Swap
Funding PDF: Θ = 1
Figure 10: Counterparty - 30 Years Swap
Funding CDF: Θ = 1
We now represent the funding distributions under the hypothesis that long term
funding contributes to total funding in the proportion of 40 % (Θ = 0.6). Long
term funding being typically more expensive than short term funding, it is expected
that when the bank reaps a benefit for a given Monte-Carlo scenario, the latter will
be greater than under the ’short-term funding only’ case, whereas, when the banks
suffers a cost, the latter will be larger as well. In turn, one expects the variance
of the funding loss distribution to increase, all the more so since the addition of
the long term funding risk introduces another parameter in our model. Also, the
behaviour of the mean is not as clear cut as one might expect, since it depends on the
relative impact of the ’increased positive scenarios’ and ’increased negative scenarios’
(in absolute terms). Indeed one can observe first an increase in loss distributions’
variances, and second the absence of a clear mean trend. In particular, the 95th
percentile of the loss distributions goes from 16,000 to 22,000 euros, and from 110,000
to 225,000 euros, for the 10 years swap and the 30 years swap, respectively. The mean
benefit of the 10 years swap increases significantly from 3,700 to 10,000 euros, whilst
the mean of the 30 years swap stays stable at 14,000 euros against 11,000 euros.
However, the take-away point is that risk increases when one considers the impact
of long-term funding.
Figures 13 and 14 exhibit similar features. The 95th percentiles of the 10 years
and 30 years swaps are multiplied by 2.5, from 16,000 to 40,000 USD, and from
110,000 to 270,000 USD, for the 10 years swap and the 30 years swap, respectively.
These comments are confirmed when complementing our analysis with the fund-
ing loss distributions for the bank and the counterparty when the short term funding
is limited to 40% of total funding (Θ = 0.4). As a matter of illustration, Figures 15
and 16 show our results for the 30 years swap. Again, they emphasize that, although
the mean is relatively stable in absolute terms, this should not give a false sense of
security as the 95th percentile is very sensitive to the weight of long term funding.
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Figure 11: Bank - 10 Years Swap
Funding PDF: Θ ∈ {1, 0.6}
Figure 12: Bank - 30 Years Swap
Funding PDF: Θ ∈ {1, 0.6}
Figure 13: Counterparty - 10 Years Swap
Funding PDF: Θ ∈ {1, 0.6}
Figure 14: Counterparty - 30 Years Swap
Funding PDF: Θ ∈ {1, 0.6}
Let us now assume that the Funding Benefit Adjustment and the Debt Valuation
Adjustment are equal and add the (unilateral) Credit Valuation Adjustment to our
examination. Figures 17 and 18 display the credit valuation adjustment as well as
the funding loss distribution corresponding to the ’short-term funding only case’, as
seen from the bank. Let us mention here that, for ease of explanation, we do not
discuss the counterparty case, as our observations lead to similar comments. The
unilateral CVA1 for the 10 years (resp. 30 years) swap amounts to 2,500 euros (resp.
18,000 euros). We also show in Figures 19 and 20 these statistics in the Θ = 0.6
case. Notice that, in the 10 years swap case, the mean increases significantly.
We conclude this chapter by discussing funding risk credit valuation adjustment.
Consider the followingM Hypothesis: the mean of the funding loss distribution is
a suitable risk statistics to express funding risk.
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Figure 15: Bank - 30 Years Swap
Funding PDF: Θ ∈ {1, 0.6, 0.4}
Figure 16: Counterparty - 30 Years Swap
Funding PDF: Θ ∈ {1, 0.6, 0.4}
Figure 17: Bank - 10 Years Swap
Funding Profile with CVA: Θ = 1
Figure 18: Bank - 30 Years Swap
Funding Profile with CVA: Θ = 1
Table 1 gives the computation of the FRCVA, under the M Hypothesis, for the
swaps without long term funding (Θ = 1) as seen by the investor. We also consolidate
our results for Θ = 0.6 in Table 2. Let us stress once again that the M Hypothesis
is not suitable in general. The associated FRA could nevertheless be interpreted
as some ”low bound adjustment” since it does not account for the possible cost of
mitigation strategies of the funding cost, such as for instance the possible allocation
of dedicated capital.
Let us finally stress that our setting allows for increasing correlation among the
interest rate curves and the credit risk spreads so as to potentially analyze right or
wrong way funding risks. This is a delicate issue however and patterns are hard
to discern. For example, take positive correlation between zero rates and credit
spreads. Since the funding rates φ are given by sums of interest rate and credit
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Figure 19: Bank - 10 Years Swap
Funding Profile with CVA: Θ = 0.6
Figure 20: Bank - 30 Years Swap
Funding Profile with CVA: Θ = 0.6
Bank 10 Years Swap 30 Years Swap
CVA 2,500 18,000
FRA - M Hypothesis -3,700 -11,000
FRCVA -1,200 7,000
Table 1: FRCVA of the Bank - Θ = 1 - M Hypothesis - Results quoted in Euros
Bank 10 Years Swap 30 Years Swap
CVA 2,500 18,000
FRA - M Hypothesis -10,000 -14,000
FRCVA -7,500 4,000
Table 2: FRCVA of the Bank - Θ = 0.6 - M Hypothesis - Results quoted in Euros
spreads, when correlation increases these tend to move more in the same direction
and will concentrate on low or high values. If interest rates go down, the payer
swap value goes down too, and the funding rates go down as well mostly, due to the
positive correlation. The value of the contract will diminish but funding costs will
diminish too, and counterparty risk will diminish as well. Some of these effects may
balance and a detailed analysis is needed to decide what kind of dependence values
really lead to wrong way risk. The two graphs in Figures 21 and 22 are examples of
the impact of increased correlation in the funding loss distribution.
It is clear that our results are proving difficult to interpret. We conclude that
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Figure 21: Bank - 10 Years Swap
Funding Profile with CVA: Θ = 0.6
and with increased correlation
Figure 22: Bank - 30 Years Swap
Funding Profile with CVA: Θ = 0.6
and with increased correlation
the setting we chose may not allow for a sensible analysis of right-or-wrong way
funding risk. We should also mention that our wrong way funding risk is similar
to wrong way credit risk in the case of interest rate swaps, since it is based on
correlation between interest rates and credit spreads. Clearly in one case we have
the bank credit spread and in the other case we have the counterparty credit spread,
but the concepts are similar. The issue of choosing a suitable modeling approach of
correlation and suitable variables for funding wrong way risk, including possibly the
CDS - Bond basis, is indeed a difficult matter that needs further development. We
will address the issue of defining a suitable framework for analysing right or wrong
way funding risk in more depth in future research.
4 Conclusion
A key issue for financial institutions nowadays is not to underestimate their funding
risk and not being arbitraged by competitors with a better view on the matter.
In this initial paper we argued that examining the funding loss distribution whilst
computing the credit valuation adjustment is a sound approach from the point of
view of a financial institution that cannot fully hedge its funding risk. We also
discussed a Weighted Cost of Funding Spread WCFS that may represent a better
approach to funding cash flows modeling than the instantaneous funding spread. In
particular, we showed examples where funding costs estimation based on the short
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term funding spread may lead to underestimation of funding risk.
In future work we need to refine our approach, investigate our setting with real
market data and remove a number of simplifying assumptions that may affect our
analysis, including assets traded in swapped form, assuming the funding period al-
ways reaches the final maturity with no defaults, discounting at the overnight rate,
model market risk premia properly, and study more comprehensive portfolios. We
should also compare the funding loss distributions statistics with the prices for fund-
ing adjustments coming from the replication approach.
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